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Definition 
Database encryption refers to the use of encryption techniques to transform a 
plain text database into a (partially) encrypted database, thus making it unreadable 
to anyone except those who possess the knowledge of the encryption key(s).  
Theory  
Database security encompasses three main properties: confidentiality, integrity 
and availability. Roughly speaking, the confidentiality property enforces predefined 
restrictions while accessing the protected data, thus preventing disclosure to 
unauthorized persons. The integrity property guarantees that the data cannot be 
corrupted in an invisible way. Finally, the availability property ensures timely and 
reliable access to the database. 
To preserve the data confidentiality, enforcing access control policies defined on 
the database management system (DBMS) is a prevailing method. An access 
control policy, that is to say a set of authorizations, can take different forms 
depending on the underlying data model (e.g., relational, XML), and the way by 
which authorizations are administered, following either a Discretionary access 
control (DAC), Role Based Access Control (RBAC) or Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC). 
Whatever the access control model, the authorizations enforced by the database 
server can be bypassed in a number of ways. For example, an intruder can infiltrate 
the information system and try to mine the database footprint on disk. Another 
source of threats comes from the fact that many databases are today outsourced to 
Database Service Providers (DSP). Then, data owners have no other choice than 
trusting DSP’s arguing that their systems are fully secured and their employees are 
beyond any suspicion, an assumption frequently denied by facts [1]. Finally, a 
database administrator (DBA) has enough privileges to tamper the access control 
definition and to spy on the DBMS behavior. 
With the spirit of an old and important principle called defense in depth (i.e., 
layering defenses such that attackers must get through layer after layer of defense), 
the resort to cryptographic techniques to complement and reinforce the access 
control has recently received much attention from the database community [1][2]. 
The purpose of database encryption is to ensure the database opacity by keeping 
the information hidden to any unauthorized persons (e.g., intruders). Even if 
attackers get though the firewall and bypass access control policies, they still need 
the encryption keys to decrypt data.  
Encryption can provide strong security for data at rest, but developing a 
database encryption strategy must take many factors into consideration. For 
example, where should be performed the encryption, in the storage layer, in the 
database or in the application where the data has been produced? How much data 
should be encrypted to provide adequate security? What should be the encryption 
algorithm and mode of operation? Who should have access to the encryption keys? 
How to minimize the impact of database encryption on performance?  
Encryption Level  
  Storage-level encryption amounts to encrypt data in the storage subsystem 
and thus protects the data at rest (e.g., from storage media theft). It is well suited for 
encrypting files or entire directories in an operating system context. From a 
database perspective, storage-level encryption has the advantage to be transparent, 
thus avoiding any changes to existing applications. On the other side, since the 
storage subsystem has no knowledge of database objects and structure, the 
encryption strategy cannot be related with user privileges (e.g., using distinct 
encryption keys for distinct users), nor to data sensitivity. Thus, selective encryption 
– i.e., encrypting only portions of the database in order to decrease the encryption 
overhead – is limited to the file granularity. Moreover, selectively encrypting files is 
risky since one should ensure that no replica of sensitive data remains unencrypted 
(e.g., in log files, temporary files, etc).  
Database-level encryption allows securing the data as it is inserted to, or 
retrieved from the database. The encryption strategy can thus be part of the 
database design and can be related with data sensitivity and/or user privileges. 
Selective encryption is possible and can be done at various granularities, such as 
tables, columns, rows. It can even be related with some logical conditions (e.g., 
encrypt salaries greater than 10K€/month). Depending on the level of integration of 
the encryption feature and the DBMS, the encryption process may incur some 
change to applications. Moreover, it may cause DBMS performance degradation 
since encryption generally forbids the use of index on encrypted data. Indeed, 
unless using specific encryption algorithms or mode of operation (e.g., order 
preserving encryption, ECB mode of operation preserving equality, see below), 
indexing encrypted data is useless. 
For both strategies, data is decrypted on the database server at runtime. Thus, 
the encryption keys must be transmitted or kept with the encrypted data on the 
server side, thereby providing a limited protection against the server administrator 
or any intruder usurping the administrator identity. Indeed, attackers could spy the 
memory and discover encryption keys or plain text data. 
Application-level encryption moves the encryption/decryption process to the 
applications that generate the data. Encryption is thus performed within the 
application that introduces the data into the system, the data is sent encrypted, thus 
naturally stored and retrieved encrypted [1][3][4], to be finally decrypted within the 
application. This approach has the benefit to separate encryption keys from the 
encrypted data stored in the database since the keys never have to leave the 
application side. However, applications need to be modified to adopt this solution. In 
addition, depending on the encryption granularity, the application may have to 
retrieve a larger set of data than the one granted to the actual user, thus opening a 
security breach. Indeed, the user (or any attacker gaining access to the machine 
where the application runs) may hack the application to access unauthorized data. 
Finally, such a strategy induces performance overheads (index on encrypted data 
are useless) and forbids the use of some advanced database functionalities on the 
encrypted data, like stored procedures (i.e., code stored in the DBMS which can be 
shared and invoked by several applications) and triggers (i.e., code fired when 
some data in the database are modified). In terms of granularity and key 
management, application-level encryption offers the highest flexibility since the 
encryption granularity and the encryption keys can be chosen depending on 
application logic. 
The three strategies described above are pictured in Figure 1.  
Figure 1. Three options for database encryption level 
Encryption Algorithm and Mode of Operation 
    Independently of the encryption strategy, the security of the encrypted data 
depends on the encryption algorithm, the encryption key size and its protection. 
Even having adopted strong algorithms, such as AES, the cipher text could still 
disclose plain text information if an inappropriate mode is chosen. For example, if 
encryption algorithm is implemented in electronic codebook mode (ECB), identical 
plaintext blocks are encrypted into identical cipher text blocks, thus disclosing 
repetitive patterns. In database context, repetitive pattern are common as many 
records could have same attribute values, so much care should be taken when 
choosing the encryption mode. Moreover, simple solutions that may work in other 
context (e.g., using counter mode with an initialization vector based on the data 
address) may fail in the database one since data can be updated (with previous 
example, performing an exclusive OR between old and new version of encrypted 
data will disclose the exclusive OR between old and new version of plain text data). 
All specificity of the database context should be taken into account to guide the 







































patterns, updates, huge volume of encrypted data. Moreover, the protection should 
be strong enough since the data may be valid for a very long time (several years). 
Thus, state-of-the-art encryption algorithm and mode of operation (without any 
concession) should be used. 
Key Management  
   Key management refers to the way cryptographic keys are generated and 
managed throughout their life. Because cryptography is based on keys that encrypt 
and decrypt data, the database protection solution is only as good as the protection 
of the keys. The location of encryption keys and their access restrictions are thus 
particularly important. Since the problem is quite independent of the encryption level, 
the following text assumes database-level encryption.  
For database level encryption, an easy solution is to store the keys in a 
restricted database table or file, potentially encrypted by a master key (itself stored 
somewhere on the database server). But all administrators with privileged access 
could also access these keys and decrypt any data within the system without ever 
being detected.  
Figure 2. Key Management Approaches 
 To overcome this problem, specialized tamper-resistant cryptographic chipsets, 
called hardware security module (HSM), can be used to provide secure storage 
for encryption keys [14][16]. Generally, the encryption keys are stored on the server 
encrypted by a master key which is stored in the HSM. At encryption/decryption 
time, encrypted keys are dynamically decrypted by the HSM (using the master key) 
and remove from the server memory as soon as the cryptographic operations are 
performed, as shown in Figure 2.a. 
An alternative solution is to move security-related tasks to distinct software 
running on a (physically) distinct server, called security server, as shown in Figure 




















































and encryption keys (potentially relying on a HSM). Within the DBMS, a security 
module communicates with the security server in order to authenticate users, check 
privileges and encrypt or decrypt data. Encryption keys can then be linked to user or 
to user’s privileges. A clear distinction is also made between the role of the DBA, 
administering the database resources, and the role of the SA (Security 
Administrator), administering security parameters. The gain in confidence comes 
from the fact that an attack requires a conspiracy between DBA and SA.  
While adding a security server and/or HSM minimizes the exposure of the 
encryption keys, it does not fully protect the database. Indeed encryption keys, as 
well as decrypted data still appear (briefly) in the database server memory and can 
be the target of attackers. 
Applications  
Since several years, most DBMS manufacturers provide native encryption 
capabilities that enable application developers to include additional measures of 
data security through selective encryption of stored data. Such native capabilities 
take the form of encryption toolkits or packages (Oracle8i/9i [15]), functions that can 
be embedded in SQL statements (IBM DB2 [5]), or extensions of SQL (Sybase [18] 
and SQL Server 2005 [14]). To limit performance overhead, selective encryption 
can be generally done at the column level but may involve changing the database 
schema to accommodate binary data resulting from the encryption process [14]. 
SQL Server 2008 [14] introduces transparent data encryption (TDE) which is 
actually very similar to storage-level encryption. The whole database is protected by 
a single key (DEK for Database Encryption Key), itself protected by more complex 
means, including the possibility to use HSM. TDE performs all of the cryptographic 
operations at the I/O level, but within the database system, and removes any need 
for application developers to create custom code to encrypt and decrypt data.  
TDE (same name as SQL Server but different functionalities) has been 
introduced in Oracle10g/11g, greatly enlarging the possibilities of using 
cryptography within the DBMS [16]. Encryption keys can now be managed by a 
HSM or be stored in an external file named wallet which is encrypted using an 
administratively defined password. Selective encryption can be done at the column 
granularity or larger (tablespace, i.e., set of data files corresponding to one or 
several tables and indexes). To avoid the analysis of encrypted data, Oracle 
proposes to include in the encryption process a Salt, a random 16 bytes string 
stored with each encrypted attribute value. An interesting, but rather dangerous, 
feature is the possibility to use encryption mode that preserve equality (typically a 
CBC mode with a constant initialization vector), thus allowing, for instance, to use 
indexes for equality predicates encrypting the searched value.  
The database-level encryption with security server approach mentioned above is 
proposed by IBM DB2 with the Data Encryption Expert (DEE [5]) and by third-party 
vendors like Protegrity [6], RSA BSAFE [17] and SafeNet [19] (appliance-based 
solution). The third-party vendors’ products can adapt to most DBMS engine 
(Oracle, IBM DB2, SQL Server and Sybase). 
Open Problems and future directions 
Encryption Scheme 
    While all existing commercial database products adopt classical encryption 
algorithms for database encryption, specific encryption schemes have attracted 
much attention in the academic field, specifically in the Database as a Service 
paradigm. In this paradigm, database service providers offer its customers 
seamless mechanisms to create, store, and access their databases at the host 
site [1]. In this context, the database server may manage encrypted data without 
having access to the encryption keys (similar to application-level encryption).  
    Privacy homomorphic (PH) encryption is a form of encryption where one can 
perform some specific algebraic operations on the plaintext by performing (possibly 
different) algebraic operations on the cipher text. The first application of PH to 
aggregation queries in relational databases is exploited in [7], but this homomorphic 
encryption function is insecure against cipher text-only attacks. In [8], it supports 
complex aggregate queries and nested queries, but this scheme may reveal 
information about the input distribution, which can be exploited. Order preserving 
encryption scheme (OPES) [9] allows building directly indexes on cipher text. OPES 
can handle, without decryption, any interesting SQL query types. Unfortunately, 
OPES has been shown insecure in [10] and their authors introduced the fast 
comparison encryption (FCE) scheme for the database-level encryption strategy. 
FCE can be used for fast comparison through partial decryption technique. It 
encrypts plaintext byte by byte allowing fast comparison starting from the most 
significant byte and stopping as soon as a difference is found.  
An alternative proposal is to use classical encryption algorithms and to store 
additional auxiliary fuzzy information, next to the cipher text in order to allow partial 
query processing on encrypted data [1][3]. Such auxiliary information shouldn’t 
reveal plain text content, thus a trade-off exists between security and efficiency: 
increasing the precision of auxiliary information increases the performance since 
more processing can be done on encrypted data, but it also increases the risk of 
data disclosure.  
New database encryption strategies 
    Currently existing architecture including database encryption are not fully 
satisfactory since, as mentioned above, encryption keys appears in plain text in the 
RAM of the server or of the client machine where the application runs. HSM acts as 
a safe storage to minimize the risk diminishing the keys exposure during its lifetime. 
Research is being conducted to make a better use of HSM, avoiding exposing 
encryption keys during the whole process. Two architectures can be considered: 
server-HSM when the HSM is shared by all users and is located on the server; 
client-HSM when the HSM is dedicated to a single user and is located near the 
user, potentially on the client machine. These two architectures are pictured in 
figure 3. 
Figure 3. HSM based new database encryption strategies 
Logically, the server-HSM is nothing more than a database-level encryption with 
a security-server embedded in the HSM. The HSM now manages users, privileges, 
encryption policies and keys. It has the same advantages as the database-level 
encryption with security-server approach but does not expose encryption keys at 
any moment (since encryption/decryption is done within the HSM). Moreover, the 
security server cannot be tampered since it is fully embedded in the tamper-
resistant HSM. With this approach, the only data that appears in plain-text is the 
query results that are delivered to the users. The main difficulty of this approach is 
its complexity, since a complex piece of software must be embedded in a HSM with 
restricted computation resources (due to security constraints). 
While the client-HSM approach seems very similar to the server-HSM one and 
brings the same benefit in terms of security, it poses several new challenges. 
Indeed, the HSM is now dedicated to a single user and is potentially far from the 
server thus making difficult any tight cooperation between the database server and 
the HSM. Thus, the database server must work on encrypted-data, and provide to 
the HSM a super-set of the query results, then decrypted and filtered in the HSM. 
Despite these difficulties, since the HSM is dedicated to a single user, the 
embedded code is simpler and less resource demanding, making this approach 
practical [4].   
Other Security Issues  
    Encrypting the data only guarantees data confidentiality, but gives no 
assurance on data integrity, i.e., on the fact that the data has not been illegally 
forged or modified (authenticity) or replaced by older versions (freshness). In 
addition, if the database server is untrusted, (e.g., it may have been tampered by 
attackers), one should check the query results correctness (results corresponds to 
the query specification) and completeness (no query result is missing). 
    Cryptographic techniques and more specifically cryptographic hash functions 
are important component for building integrity checking techniques. Typically, 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) can be used to ensure data authenticity and, 





































completeness [11] . Ensuring freshness is more complex since an element of trust 
is needed to keep information about the current version of each data. 
    Using cryptographic techniques “as-is” to provide the aforementioned 
guarantees has a large negative impact on the database size (e.g., a 20 bytes MAC 
is added to each encrypted attribute value in Oracle 11g TDE to ensure data 
authenticity) and on the database performance, thus motivating many on-going 
research on that topics. For instance, in the Database as a Service (DAS) context 
[1], as MHT imposes severe concurrency constraints that slow down data updates, 
a new signature based authentication method has been introduced recently, for 
checking the authenticity, completeness and freshness of query answers [12].  In 
addition, some probabilistic approaches are also used to provide integrity assurance 
for outsourced database [13].  
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